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Behavioural Evidence Analysis (BEA) is, in theory, useful in developing an understanding of
the offender, the victim, the crime scene, and the dynamics of the crime. It can add
meaning to the evidence obtained through digital forensic techniques and assist investigators with reconstruction of a crime. There is, however, little empirical research
examining the application of BEA to actual criminal cases, particularly cyberstalking cases.
This study addresses this gap by examining the utility of BEA for such cases in terms of
understanding the behavioural and motivational dimensions of offending, and the way in
which digital evidence can be interpreted. It reports on the forensic analysis of 20
cyberstalking cases investigated by Dubai Police in the last ﬁve years. Results showed that
BEA helps to focus an investigation, enables better understanding and interpretation of
victim and offender behaviour, and assists in inferring traits of the offender from available
digital evidence. These beneﬁts can help investigators to build a stronger case, reduce time
wasted to mistakes, and to exclude suspects wrongly accused in cyberstalking cases.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Introduction
With the ubiquity of Internet-enabled devices and social
media, cyberstalking is increasingly recognised as a serious
and common crime. For example, an online survey of 1588
youth (10e15 years old) revealed that 15% were subject to
unwanted online sexual solicitation, and 33% experienced
online harassment (Ybarra and Mitchell, 2008). A survey of
2839 adult Internet users reported that 40% had experienced different variations of online harassment, including
cyberstalking (Duggan et al., 2014). Bocij and McFarlane
(2002) found 45.5% of his UK sample were victimised in
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: nal-mutawa@uclan.ac.uk, jbryce@uclan.ac.uk (N. Al
Mutawa).

this way. Recent research using students samples found
that 34%e64% of them had experienced this behaviour in
America and Australia respectively (Patchin, 2015; Bullying
statistics in Australia, 2014). Another Australian survey
indicated that 98% of domestic violence victims had also
experienced some form of cyberstalking (Rawlinson, 2015).
Dubai Police reports indicate an increase of 39% in cyberstalking cases during the years 2010e2014 (Database of
Electronic Crimes, 2014). A number of other studies that
have examined cyberstalking suggest that this is a widespread type of online offending which is poorly understood
and addressed (Alexy et al., 2005; Baum et al., 2009).
The use of advanced technologies to commit cyberstalking raises signiﬁcant investigative and evidential
challenges. The theoretical and empirical literature on the
behaviour and characteristics of cyberstalkers is limited.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2016.01.012
1742-2876/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Nevertheless, behaviour associated with this offence category generates speciﬁc forms of evidence which can be
extracted from digital devices during the investigative
process. The extracted evidence can then be analysed using
Behavioural Evidence Analysis (BEA) (Turvey, 2011) in
order to build a speciﬁc proﬁle of offenders to determine
the motivations associated with their offending behaviour,
their relationship with the victim(s), and risk of progression to physical stalking. As such, examining this evidence
also has the potential to inform theoretical understanding
of cyberstalker behaviour and motivations.
This paper explores the utility of BEA for the examination and interpretation of digital evidence using 20 cyberstalking cases collected from Dubai Police. Its contribution
is twofold: (1) it advances the state-of-practice by incorporating BEA in all stages of the examination and analysis
of digital evidence using real-life cases, and (2) it advances
the state-of-literature by further examining cyberstalkers’
motivations and modus operandi.
The paper is organized as follows. Section Background
provides a brief review of the literature on BEA and
cyberstalking. Section Related Work reviews work related
to criminal proﬁling in cyberstalking crimes, and incorporating BEA into digital forensics investigations. Sections
Methodology and Results describe the methodology used
in the study and the results obtained respectively. Section
Discussion discusses the results, and ﬁnally Section
Conclusion and Future Work presents the conclusions and
identiﬁes areas for future work.
Background
Behavioural Evidence Analysis
BEA is a deductive, case-based investigative strategy
that analyses evidence from a speciﬁc case focusing on
certain behavioural and personality traits to derive characteristics of the probable offender (Turvey, 2011). BEA
consists of four steps: equivocal forensic analysis, victimology, crime scene characteristics, and offender
characteristics.
Equivocal forensic analysis aims to review the case evidence scientiﬁcally, thoroughly and objectively to develop
theories that are justiﬁed by actual facts, to avoid misconceptions in an investigation, and to gradually illuminate
the truth (Turvey, 2011). The utility of this approach has
been highlighted in the digital forensics literature in the
context of conducting an analysis in which the reliability
and signiﬁcance of all available evidence is evaluated
objectively to enable a clearer understanding of the dynamics of a speciﬁc crime (Casey et al., 2011).
Victimology examines the traits of victims (e.g., physical
characteristics, marital status, personal lifestyle) in criminal investigations, aiming to identify why they have been
particularly targeted and approached. This can further
inform understanding of offender motivations and their
connection to the victim (Turvey, 2011; Casey et al., 2011;
Karmen, 2012).
Characteristics of the virtual crime scene can provide
investigators with information about offenders and their
motivations. A careful examination of such characteristics
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can also answer questions regarding the case, uncover
more evidence, and be correlated with an offender's
behavioural decisions (Turvey, 2011).
The ﬁnal stage of BEA relates to offender characteristics.
In this stage, the investigator combines the results from the
preceding 3 steps to determine the probable behavioural
and personality characteristics of the offender, and
construct an associated proﬁle.
Cyberstalking
The literature deﬁnes cyberstalking as a collection of
behaviours where one or more persons use information
technology (e.g., email, social networking websites) to
repeatedly pursue and harass another person or group in
order to cause the victims to experience fear, alarm, and
feel threatened (Bocij and McFarlane, 2002; Harvey, 2003).
These behaviours may include making threats, false accusations, monitoring, and impersonation (Lyndon et al.,
2011; Mishra and Mishra, 2008).
While in traditional stalking an individual is persistently
watched, followed or harassed with unsolicited and
obsessive attention, another dimension is added when
computers are used as they provide another avenue for
abuse by offenders. The stalker may bombard the victim
with material using email wherever they are, while the
offender remains unknown, instilling constant fear or
making them feel threatened (Harvey, 2003). The use of
technology also allows offenders to hide their identity.
Being anonymous makes it easy for the offender to target
the victim without the need or ability to see their physical
or psychological response (Ashcroft, 2001). Technological
devices also have a distancing effect which can encourage
offenders to act and express themselves in ways that they
would not in a traditional face-to-face encounter (Kowalski
et al., 2012). Offenders can also use multiple 'aliases'
allowing multiple online personas to be built, complicating
the investigation of cyberstalking cases (Stephenson and
Walter, 2011).
Related work
Understanding cyberstalking
A relatively small number of studies have been conducted examining cyberstalking offender and victim behaviours, offender motivations, and victimeoffender
relationships. Motivations for cyberstalking are similar to
those identiﬁed in online offenders. These include the
desire to exert control over victims, seeking intimacy or
attempting to initiate a relationship with the victim (e.g.,
Dimond et al., 2011; Joseph, 2003; McEwan et al., 2009).
Ofﬂine stalkers have been found to exhibit a variety of
different psychological deﬁcits and problems (e.g., mood
and personality disorders), and there is evidence to suggest
that cyberstalkers have similar deﬁcits (e.g., McEwan et al.,
2009; Spitzberg and Veksler, 2007). This implies that offenders may use stalking behaviours as a way of coping
with relationship breakdown, psychological problems or to
meet emotional needs which they are unable to meet in
other ways. The online environment provides additional
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opportunities to meet these needs as a result of the
increased access to potential victims, contact and the potential for surveillance (e.g., McEwan et al., 2009; Spitzberg
and Veksler, 2007).
A number of typologies developed to describe traditional stalkers have been applied to cyberstalkers. Zona
et al. (1993) categorized stalkers into love obsessionals,
erotomanics, and simple obsessionals (Zona et al., 1993).
Harmon et al. (1995) classiﬁed stalkers as angry, amorous,
affectionate or persecutory based on the nature of their
attachment to victims. Offenders were additionally classiﬁed as personal, employment, professional, acquaintance
or media based on their prior relationships with their victims. Finally, Kienlen et al. (1997) classiﬁed stalkers into
two groups: psychotic and non-psychotic.
While these ofﬂine typologies have been applied to
cyberstalkers, McFarlane and Bocij (2003) argued that they
do not fully address the dynamics of this behaviour in the
online environment. They subsequently developed a typology based on interviews with 24 cyberstalking victims
which identiﬁed four categories of offenders:
1. Vindictive cyberstalkers are characterized by relentless
harassment of their victim without a speciﬁc reason.
They are frequently suffering from psychological
disorders.
2. Composed cyberstalkers aim to cause constant annoyance and irritation to the targeted victim. They have no
desire to establish a relationship with their victim, and
are motivated to cause them distress.
3. Intimate cyberstalkers are characterized by the desire
to attract the attention or affection of their victim. They
usually have detailed knowledge of the person being
targeted.
4. Collective cyberstalkers consist of a group of individuals harassing their victims through the use of
communication technology.
The Bocij and McFarlane (2002) typology is primarily
based on how victims interpreted and described the behaviours of their cyberstalkers. As a result, the categories
that they identiﬁed are very general and do not provide a
level of description adequate to aid the investigation of
speciﬁc cyberstalking cases (Stephenson and Walter, 2011).

Integrating BEA in digital forensics cases
The utility of BEA has been recognised in assisting the
investigation of many traditional crimes (e.g., murder, sex
offences, rape) (Lowe, 2002; Bennett and Hess, 2007). BEA
is believed to also be of equal utility in investigating digital
crimes (Turvey, 2011; Casey, 2006; Rogers, 2003). Digital
ﬁles and artefacts (e.g., written communications, Internet
history ﬁles, deleted ﬁles, time stamps) can reveal useful
information about the behaviour and characteristics of
victims/offenders (Rogers, 2003). This helps the investigator develop connections and enables a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the crime. This can be used to
create a more solid reconstruction that aids in providing an
explainable basis for expert judgment and opinion.

There is, however, very little research or practice in
digital crime investigations which incorporates BEA,
particularly for cyberstalking crimes. There is even less in
the literature that concerns the utility of BEA in assisting in
interpretation of digital evidence in these crimes. Silde and
Angelopoulou (2014) attempted to develop a cyberstalker
proﬁling methodology by utilising BEA in digital forensics
investigation (Silde and Angelopoulou, 2014). They used a
simulation of cyberstalking behaviour, which was analysed
using digital forensics techniques alongside BEA. They
recognise BEA as an instrument of triage (i.e., a way to focus
digital forensics investigations on locations that are more
likely to contain relevant evidence). Rogers (2015) proposed a model which incorporates BEA into the process of
digital forensics investigation. The proposed model includes six phases: Case classiﬁcation, context analysis, data
collection, statistical analysis, timeline analysis/visualisation, and decision/opinion. He employed three case
studies to illustrate the beneﬁts of conducting frequency
analysis and timeline analysis in digital investigations.
However, to the best of our knowledge there has been
no empirical research published focused on applying BEA
to the investigation of real cyberstalking cases.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology used to conduct
the study. A similar methodology has been used in a previous study conducted by the authors with cases involving
Sexually Exploitative Imagery of Children (SEIC) (Authors,
2015). The study was conducted at the secured labs of the
Department of Electronic Evidence of Dubai Police. The
data used were duplicated copies of the contents of the
computers that were seized in cyberstalking cases.
Case selection and sample size
The selection of cases utilized criterion sampling
(Patton, 2001), with inclusion based on victim experience
of behaviour which met the deﬁnition of cyberstalking, use
of a computer as the main offending platform, and the
availability of image ﬁles.
The sample consisted of twenty cases that involved
different variations of cyberstalking (e.g., monitoring, false
accusations), and were committed in Dubai within the last
ﬁve years. These cases involved 31 computers. The hard
disk drives of all of these computers had been previously
acquired, veriﬁed and archived by the Electronic Evidence
Department at Dubai Police.
Data sources
The primary data sources for this study were the electronic data stored on the image ﬁles acquired of the seized
computer hard disk drives for each case. Also, for each case,
all the related documents were obtained for analysis (e.g.,
background of the offence, interview scripts).
In this category of crime, a digital forensics practitioner
mostly receives the victims’ computer/s. In cases where
there were identiﬁed suspects, their computer/s were also
seized for examination. As such, the examination of the
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devices attempts to reconstruct the communication between offenders and victims, identify the predominant
motivation of the offenders, understand the context in
which the cyberstalking occurred, and identify the prior
relationship between victim and offender.
Data collection and analysis
The study combined the techniques of digital forensics
and the strategies of BEA. As the study utilised a deductive
approach, understanding the context of each case was a
crucial step prior to analysing the associated evidence.
Thus, for each case, all available documentation was carefully studied before the image ﬁles were analysed. A clear
understanding of the events that led to the incidents was
developed. The activities of the offenders and victims were
analysed through reconstruction of communications, recovery of deleted emails, recovery and reconstruction of
social networking communication artefacts, and the
acquisition of other cybertrails (e.g., documents, images,
videos, registry keys, Internet cache and history ﬁles, ﬁle
metadata).
The analysis process of the collected data was circular,
iterative, and progressive. The two frameworks; digital forensics (traditional examination and analysis phases) and
BEA (deﬁned by Turvey (2011) and reviewed in Section
Background), complemented each other and were performed concurrently. For each case, the extracted digital
evidence at each step was used as input to BEA, and the
output was used to provide direction to additional locations
of potential evidence, provide insights on offender/victim
behaviour and characteristics, and further inform the investigation process. The ﬁndings of the analysis for each case
were summarized, and similarity in data sources, interpretation and characteristics grouped together. The analysis of
the qualitative data obtained through the forensic device
examination and from the investigative ﬁles (e.g., cyberstalking communications) was also undertaken using thematic analysis, as described and used by other researchers
(e.g., Bryce and Fraser, 2014; Braun and Clarke, 2006).
During the analysis, the researcher also collected and
grouped data that could be compared with previous work
in the ﬁeld. This involved characteristics of the offender and
victim including age, gender, ethnicity, employment status,
marital status, qualiﬁcation, and computer literacy. It also
included offender speciﬁc characteristics such as history of
assaultive behaviour, criminal record, and psychiatric history. Further, the researcher examined variables related to
the offending behaviour: the length of online harassment,
means of contact (e.g., email, personal chat service), social
networking sites, forums and bulletin boards. The set of
factors related to the style and content of communication:
impersonation, use of imagery, proclamation of love, sexual
comments, threats and violent comments, and defamation.
Results
Victim and offender characteristics
Table 1 describes victim and offender characteristics.
Victims were 23e48 years old, while offenders were 21e63
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Table 1
Characteristics of cyberstalking victims and offenders.
Characteristics

Victims

Offenders

Age range
21e30
31e40
41þ
Gender
Female
Male
Ethnicity
Caucasian
Middle Eastern
East Asian/South Asian
Professional status
High professional status
Middle professional status
Low professional status
Student
Unemployed

23e48
8/20 (40%)
6/20 (30%)
6/20 (30%)

21e63
4/20 (20%)
7/20 (35%)
9/20 (45%)

15/20 (75%)
5/20 (25%)

4/20 (20%)
16/20 (80%)

6/20 (30%)
9/20 (45%)
5/20 (25%)

7/20 (35%)
8/20 (40%)
5/20 (25%)

2/20 (10%)
12/20 (60%)
3/20 (15%)
1/20 (5%)
2/20 (10%)

0/20 (0%)
14/20 (70%)
4/20 (20%)
0/20 (0%)
2/20 (10%)

years old. The majority of the victims were female (75%),
consistent with other research ﬁndings (Stephenson and
Walter, 2011). In terms of ethnicity, a lower percentage of
East Asians and South Asians (25%) experienced cyberstalking compared to Middle Easterners (45%) and Caucasians (30%).
The majority of the offenders and victims were
employed at the time that the offence occurred (80% for
both), though their professional status varied: 10% of victims had a high professional status, and the majority (60%)
were of a middle professional status. 70% of offenders were
also of middle professional status, and 20% were of low
professional status.
Victim/offender prior relationship
Table 2 describes the gender and prior relationship between offenders and victims. Unlike results from other
studies (e.g., McFarlane and Bocij, 2003), all of the victims
and offenders had a prior relationship. 35% had a previous
intimate relationship, and 40% were work colleagues.
Further, the majority of the cyberstalkers were males (80%).
In most of the cases (60%) females were stalked by males,
and in 20% of the cases males stalked males.
Offending behaviour
The analysed data showed that emails were the most
prevalent means of contact in cyberstalking incidents, as
Table 2
Gender and offender/victim relationship.
Relationship
Ex-intimates
Acquaintances
Work Colleagues
Met online
Unknown
Stalkerevictim behaviour
Maleefemale
Femaleemale
Femaleefemale
Maleemale

Percentage
7/20
2/20
8/20
2/20
1/20

(35%)
(10%)
(40%)
(10%)
(5%)

12/20
1/20
3/20
4/20

(60%)
(5%)
(15%)
(20%)
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Table 3
Means and length of cyberstalking.
Offending behaviour
Stalking duration
6 months or less
7 monthse1 year
2 years
Unknown
Means of contact
Emails
Social networking websites
Forums and bulletin boards
Dating websites

Victims
12/20
4/20
1/20
3/20

(60%)
(20%)
(5%)
(15%)

11/20
5/20
1/20
3/20

(55%)
(25%)
(5%)
(15%)

shown in Table 3. In more than half of the analysed cases
(55%), offenders used emails to initiate contact with their
victims. In 15% of the cases, the cyberstalkers communicated with their victims via their personal email accounts.
In 25% of the cases, the communication was through the
victims' workplace email accounts, and in 15% of the cases
the offenders had access to their victims’ email accounts
and used this to impersonate them. The next most frequent
method of cyberstalking was through social networking
websites; mainly Facebook and Twitter. Cyberstalkers used
these websites to post embarrassing, hateful, or threatening comments about their victims. Dating websites were
mainly used to impersonate the victims, to post false
comments regarding the sexual fantasies or desires of the
victims, and encourage visitors to contact them. Only two
victims had also experienced ofﬂine stalking by their
cyberstalker.
In the majority of the analysed cases (60%), the cyberstalking offence lasted between three weeks and six
months.
Thematic analysis of the offender/victim communications showed that the majority of cyberstalkers used either
threats and words of violence, or words of love and
obsession. In 33.3% of the cases, the offender committed
identity theft by impersonating the victim online. None of
the offenders used third parties or encouraged third parties
to join them in their stalking. Also, most of the cyberstalkers who showed vengeful behaviour were either exspouses or disgruntled employees. Table 4 shows a number of actions and quotes of offenders inferred from the
digital evidence found in the analysed cases.

BEA as an investigative tool in digital forensics
Combining BEA with the standard digital forensics
investigation process on the 20 cyberstalking cases proved
to be useful in many ways. Examples of the interpretive and
investigative utility of the different types of analysed digital
evidence are provided in this section to demonstrate the
value of this combined approach.
Focus, speed, and investigative directions
In one case, the victim reported (in the background
documentation of the case) suspicious activity on her
computer stating that messages containing hateful words
were popping up on her screen. To start with, we examined

the registry ﬁles on the victim's computer, which showed
that hacking software was installed. This indicated that her
machine was indeed compromised and could be remotely
accessed. The victim suspected two people with whom she
used to have online relationships. The victim's computer
did not have any anti-virus software, which indicated
limited understanding of how to protect her computer. To
ﬁnd out how the hacking software was installed on the
victim's computer, we ﬁrst ran a scan for malicious software on all the user ﬁles. The result showed a short list of
malicious ﬁles and their logical locations on the computer.
One ﬁle stood out as it was located in the download ﬁle of a
speciﬁc chat client software that the victim used. Analysing
the ﬁle showed that double-clicking on it would install the
hacking software shown in the registry. Examining the chat
logs indicated that one of the people whom she suspected
had sent her this ﬁle. This indicated that the victim naively
downloaded and ran the malicious ﬁle without checking it
ﬁrst, which put her at risk of victimization. Checking the
collected evidence from the suspect's computer supported
the allegation that he was the cyberstalker.
This example demonstrates how BEA can beneﬁt an
investigation by providing a speciﬁc focus and direction for
subsequent search strategies, as well as understanding the
behavioural characteristics of the victim and offender. It is
very important to understand the context of the offence
before starting to analyse the digital device to identify
relevant evidence. This can assist the digital forensics
practitioner in identifying the starting point for evidence
recovery rather an ad hoc, unfocused search of a huge
number of potentially relevant ﬁles.
Infer behaviours of victim/offender and motivations
In another case, the offender created a fake proﬁle in the
victim's name on a dating website. He uploaded indecent
pictures of the victim, and posted fabricated explicit messages detailing her sexual fantasies and soliciting visitors to
contact her to engage in sexual acts. He also posted her
email address. The victim reported a suspect to the police.
Examining the victim's online activities (through web
browser cache and history ﬁles) indicated that she was a
regular visitor to the dating website in question. In the
interview transcript, the victim stated that she had met the
suspect online through this site, and had a brief relationship with him which she ended. Examining the chat logs of
her most recent conversations with the suspect showed a
steady ﬂow of messages from the suspect that started with
words of love, trying to re-establish relationship with her,
which then gradually shifted to words of anger and intense
emotional responses. Examining the suspect's computer
indicated that it had been used to log into the victim's fake
proﬁle several times. The suspect's computer also had
copies of pictures of the victim that had been uploaded to
the proﬁle, apparently to seek revenge for their failed
relationship.
The previous example demonstrates how digital evidence can reﬂect the behaviours of the victim/offender and
assist in understanding the dynamics of the crime. In this
case, the victim's regular visits to the dating website and
meeting people she had met online in the ofﬂine environment increased her risk of victimisation. The offender's
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Table 4
Cyberstalking behaviour and motivation inferred from the digital evidence.
Cyberstalkers probable motivation

Cyberstalker actions/quotes from digital evidence

False accusation of
victims/defamation

▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

Proclamations of love

Vengeance/anger

Collecting information about the
victim/Tracing the victim

Posting obscene/morphed images of victim on social networking sites.
Sending obscene/morphed images of the victim through email to friends and family of the victim.
Posting images and personal information of the victim on dating websites. (impersonating the victim)
Sending offensive emails to work colleagues from the victims email account.
Sending emails with obscene/false information about the victim to friends/family/work colleagues.
Sending emails repeatedly proclaiming love, and showing obsession with the victim.
Sending emails repeatedly mentioning memories of their past relationship.
Sending excessively needy and demanding emails.
Sending intimate/pornographic images.
“You will regret what you did for the rest of your life!”
“Wherever you are… I will come and get you.”
“[Name of executive of a company] is dishonest, unprofessional and a cheater”.
Remotely accessing the victim's computer.
Gathering information on the victim and organizing them in folders.

written communications and creation of the obscene fake
proﬁle for the victim indicated that he was apparently
seeking revenge for a failed relationship.
Written online communications revealed useful evidence in most of the analysed cases. In terms of behaviour,
it indicated signature behaviours of the offender (e.g.,
repeated syntax, spelling, grammar mistakes, nicknames).
It also indicated the motivation of the offender (e.g., sexual,
hatred). In terms of investigative utility, it provided evidence of the victim/offender relationship, added to the
understanding of the context of the crime, and helped
identify the most probable offender (in cases having more
than one suspect). Table 4 provides some illustrative quotations extracted from the written communication from the
sample cases, and reﬂect the motivations of the offenders.
User ﬁles and folders, as well as web browser cache and
history ﬁles, are also useful in cyberstalking cases. They can
indicate the victim's interests and lifestyle (e.g., search
terms, regularly visited social networks) which might have
exposed them to the offender and victimisation. They can
indicate offender's interests and related offence motivations. These ﬁles can also identify links/traces to other
possible victims/suspects, as well as other evidence indicating that an offence occurred. For example, in one case
the offender's computer had a user-created folder that
stored ﬁles of morphed explicit images of the victim, plus
the original picture of the victim, and evidence of using
speciﬁc software to create those images.
Depending on the speciﬁc type of cyberstalking, the
number of ﬁles, where they are stored, as well as the
presence of ﬁles containing paraphilic materials, can also
indicate the offender's existing deviant sexual interests.
This can add to the proﬁle of the offender by providing
further evidence of the motivation for their behaviour. For
instance, the presence of child pornography on the hard
disk of a suspect accused of cyberstalking an underage
victim may suggest that they had a sexual motivation for
their behaviour.
Identify potential victims
Sorting and categorizing victims' ﬁles indicates offender
commitment to their behaviour as represented by the time
and effort taken to organise victim information. It also

provides evidence about other current or potential victims.
In one of the cases, evidence showed that the current
victim was not the only person targeted by the offender. An
examination of the offender's computer indicated that they
had created a folder with subfolders that included different
information and pictures of three females in addition to the
victim that reported him.
Depending on the type of cyberstalking and other factors (e.g., ﬁle types and location, timestamps, deleted ﬁles
on the offender's computer), digital evidence can provide
indications of other offence-related behaviour. For
example, if the deleted ﬁles were pictures of the victim or
victim-related data that were originally stored in a user
created directory, this would indicate the offender's speciﬁc
interest in the victim. It can also indicate their intention to
cyberstalk the victim, and then deleting the crime-related
ﬁles to evade detection.
Eliminate suspects
In a ﬁnal case, the offender harassed the victim by
impersonating her on a Facebook account and posting her
pictures accompanied with offensive comments. Her main
suspect was her ex-husband who had remarried after their
divorce. Examining the ex-husband's computer showed a
folder that contained her pictures posing either alone, or
alongside with the ex-husband and their daughter. Analysing the web browser history proved that the Facebook
account in question has been logged into many times. At
this point, the evidence seemed to support the victim's
suspicion that her ex-husband was to blame. However,
performing a timeline analysis identiﬁed periods of intense
activity on the Facebook account, which were mostly during week days between 9:00 am and 2:00 pm. Since the exhusband worked during this period of the day, the only
other possible offender with access to the same computer
was the new wife, who was at home during this time
window.
In order to maximize the investigative value of the
collected digital evidence, a timeline analysis must be
conducted. Evidence ﬁles must not be examined separately.
Whenever possible, associated dates and times of the
collected data must be correlated to other time stamps (e.g.,
from statements of the victim and offender). This can
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provide a timeline for the activities involving the offender
and victim that can aid in the reconstruction of the crime. It
can also provide a timeframe of activities that can be
checked against the claims of the victim/offender. Variation
in a ﬁle's time stamp can indicate user treatment of the ﬁle
(e.g., whether they had altered an innocent picture of a
victim into an obscene image). Time stamps can also suggest how long the offender has been in possession of speciﬁc ﬁles and the length of time they were planning
cyberstalking the victim/s. Finally, correlating ﬁle time
stamps with the daily activities of suspects can help
determine the probable offender in cases where multiple
suspects use the same computer (Rogers, 2015).
Discussion
The majority of the cyberstalking offenders in the
sample exhibited behaviour that was consistent with the
class of composed and intimate cyberstalkers as identiﬁed
by McFarlane and Bocij (2003). However, similar to the
study conducted on SEIC cases (Authors, 2015), the results
of this study suggest that it is not possible to construct a
single proﬁle of cyberstalking offenders, as this does not
reﬂect the dynamic nature of offending. The identiﬁed
offender characteristics and behaviours were also consistent with prior inductive studies of the same crime category (McFarlane and Bocij, 2003). This suggests that whilst
offenders share common demographic characteristics (e.g.,
criminal history), speciﬁc behaviours are reﬂected in the
digital evidence which are unique to each offence and
offender (Turvey, 2011).
This research used existing standard practice in the ﬁeld
of digital forensics and integrated the four stages of BEA as
deﬁned by Turvey (2011) within the technical examination
of the digital evidence. Results showed that using this
approach when investigating cyberstalking cases assisted
the investigator in a number of ways. It had the beneﬁt of
focusing the investigation, and providing logical directions
for identifying the location of further relevant evidence.
This increased the efﬁciency and speed of the investigation.
It also enabled more effective understanding and interpretation of victim/offender behaviours (e.g., probable
offender motivations, amount of planning, victim risk factors), which facilitated a more in depth understanding of
the dynamics of the speciﬁc crime. Further, in some cases it
enabled the identiﬁcation of potential victims other than
the person originally reporting the crime. Finally, it eliminated suspects in cases where the computer in question
was accessed by more than one user through the same user
account.
As the physical crime scene is usually absent in cyberstalking crimes (unless the cyberstalker escalated to
physical stalking), the computer can be considered to be
the primary crime scene (virtual crime scene). The analysed
cyberstalking cases indicated that, similar to ofﬂine crime,
the offender exhibits and leaves indications of certain
distinctive behaviours in the virtual environment that can
be inferred from the digital evidence. This is particularly
useful in cases were the offender demonstrates sufﬁcient
technical skill to conceal traces of their behaviour. BEA can
assist in inferring distinguishable traits of the offender from

the available digital evidence in such cases to further
inform the investigation. In serious cases, this can
contribute towards as assessment of the risk that an
offender is likely to physically harm their victims or
themselves. This can assist investigators to develop an
effective strategy to prevent harm to the involved parties.
These beneﬁts combine to enable investigators to build a
solid case and to reduce mistakes, wasted effort, and the
mishandling and misinterpretation of digital evidence. For
example, overlooking exculpatory digital evidence can lead
to the prosecution of the wrong individual. Likewise,
misinterpretation of incriminating digital evidence can
prevent proving a case beyond a reasonable doubt. Having
a more detailed understanding of offending behaviour can
also ensure the identiﬁcation of all relevant evidence and
its correct interpretation. It also provides context, connections and investigative directions.
While the use of BEA proved to have utility in investigating the cyberstalking crimes in this sample, it had some
limitations. For example, the quality of the data used in this
study was limited by the availability of cases with sufﬁcient
data in the police archives. BEA also has greater utility
when there is a variety of digital evidence available that
reﬂects the actions and behaviours of the offender/victims
(e.g., written communications). It is also important to
recognise that the experience, skill, critical analysis and
judgment of the digital practitioner are necessary contributors to the application of BEA and interpretation of digital
evidence. The researchers provided the most appropriate
interpretation of the recovered digital evidence based on
their experience in the ﬁeld and theoretical perspectives on
offending from the related psychological literature. However, we cannot discount the possibility of some bias in
interpretation.
The results of the research suggest that, although there
are limitations associated with the use of BEA, it can
contribute to further understanding of the dynamics of
cyberstalking crimes by mapping the digital evidence onto
offending behaviour in the online environment. This is
particularly useful in relation to this category of cybercrime
as current knowledge about offender behaviour and
investigative strategies is currently underdeveloped.

Conclusion and future work
This study addressed the application of Behavioural
Evidence Analysis (BEA) to cyberstalking cases, using a set
of real cyberstalking cases. By applying BEA to these cases
we have demonstrated that BEA can be useful in determining the motivation of offenders and their modus operandi in the cases. The study also examined the
psychological and behavioural dimensions of this category
of offending and victimisation within the context of digital
forensics investigations. These are too often limited in their
approach by a restricted focus on examination of the
technical evidence, without sufﬁcient consideration of its
related behavioural and motivational implications. By discussing how we applied BEA to these cases in detail, this
paper also provides an introduction to the application of
BEA in practical digital forensics investigation.
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There are several major directions for future work
leading directly from this study. First, experimenting with a
greater number of cyberstalking cases from different
countries is required to examine a greater variety of digital
evidence that may more effectively reﬂect the dynamics of
the crime, as well as offender and victim behaviours. Second, being crime-speciﬁc, this work is a foundation for
customising a digital forensics investigation methodology
that incorporates BEA for cyberstalking cases.
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